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A LEGAL FIG LEAF?
Richard Posner and Geoffrey Stone
debate warrants and wiretapping
BY RICHARD FIELDS, '06
IN AN ONGOING EFFORT TO MAP THE BALANCING OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND SECURITY MEASURES, POSNER AND STONE
MET TO DEBATE THE MERITS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM.
THE EVENT WAS SPONSORED BY THE LAW SCHOOL'S CHAP-
TER OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION.
Classroom
II overflowed with students, faculty, and
members of the media in anticipation of the
afternoon debate between Richard Posner, a judge
on the United States Court ofAppeals for the Seventh
Circuit and a Senior Lecturer at the Law School, and
Geoffrey Stone, '71, the Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished
Service Professor of Law at the Law School. In contention
were the merits of the National Security Administration's
(NSA) domestic
surveillance program.
Because the turnout
was greater than
expected, the Law
School's chapter of
the American Civil
Liberties Union,
the debate sponsor,
moved the crowd •
Geoffrey Stone to the auditorium.
With the help of moderator Joseph Margulies, a Lecturer
in Law at the Law School and attorney for MacArthur
Justice Center, Posner and Stone discussed the legal and
policy issues surrounding the NSA program.
Posner did not wish to directly address the legality of
the program in order not to be in a position of commenting
on a matter that might come before his court, so Stone began
by discussing both sides of the debate. The two major
challenges to the legality of the NSA program are that it
violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and that it violates the statutory
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). With regard
to the Fourth Amendment challenge, Stone noted that
there is no clear precedent but that the Keith case (United
States v. United States District Court) held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited domestic surveillance without the
oversight of a neutral magistrate and that it could easily be
extended to prohibit the Bush Administration's NSA program.
Responding to this point without directly addressing the
legality of the NSA program, Posner cited Illinois v. Lidster,
a recent Supreme Court decision. In Lidster, the Court
denied a Fourth Amendment challenge against a search at
a roadblock designed to gather information about a
Stone: ""Warrantsprevent
the executive branch from
running amok.
"
perplexing hit and run crime. When officers at the roadblock
discovered that Lidster was driving drunk, he was arrested
and later convicted. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
upheld the use of the roadblock, arguing that it was minimally
intrusive and had significant benefits and, as such, was a
constitutional search. Apparently in agreement with the
majority's opinion in Lidster, Posner suggested that the
decision could be used to support the NSA program against
a Fourth Amendment challenge.
Next, addressing the argument that the NSA surveillance
violates FISA, Stone stated that FISA was a compromise
designed to ease information gathering in foreign locales
but also to require that no search be undertaken without
probable cause. Stone addressed-and ultimately
dismissed-the arguments that the Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF) created an exception to FISA.
The problem, Stone stated, was that FISA specifically
authorizes a departure from its procedures when there is a
declaration of war. Following such a declaration, the
President is authorized to act outside of FISA for fifteen
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days, a period that can be extended by Congress. Since the
AUMF cannot be something more than a declaration of
war, it makes no sense that the AUMF would authorize a
greater departure from FISA than a war declaration.
Stone believed that the stronger argument (that the
wiretapping did not violate FISA) is that FISA itself is an
unconstitutional restriction on the President's Article II
commander-in-chief authority. Yet Stone rejected this
argument, explaining that not a single Supreme Court or
Court ofAppeals decision in the history of the nation has
struck down legislation as an unconstitutional restriction
on the commander-in-chiefs authority. Further, Stone
noted, Youngstown v. Sawyer, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and the
Pentagon Papers case stand for a more limited view of
commander-in-chief authority.
Both Posner and Stone spoke at length about the wisdom
of the NSA surveillance program. Noting how easy it is to
get a traditional warrant, Posner went on to describe how
much easier it is to get a FISA warrant. Given the incredibly
low bar for issuance, Posner implied that there was a minimal­
to-nonexistent value
to such warrants.
Further, Posner
stated that warrants
offer the executive
branch a "legal
fig leaf" shielding it
from direct
accountability. If the
executive branch
Richard Posner can pass the blame
along to the court that authorized the warrant, it avoids
paying the price for its actions. In response, Professor Stone
argued that warrants prevent the executive branch from
running amok. The warrant requirement itself prevents agents
of the executive branch from seeking dearly illegal searches
and otherwise keeps actors honest. Stone also disagreed
with Posner's view that warrants prevent accountability,
noting that the lack of warrants"'for NSA wiretapping kept
the program completely secret and free from public review.
Stone carried this argument further, noting that the reason
people should be upset with the Bush administration is
that they do not trust the government to save and use
information obtained during warrantless NSA surveillance
only for issues of national security. Although Posner
argued that any information obtained in such a way could
only be used for national security purposes, even if that
meant turning a blind eye child pornography or a planned
murder, Stone said that he does not trust the government
to look away. Further, Posner argued that the NSA program
does not substantially threaten privacy as the biggest
threats to privacy are issues of physical privacy, such as
searches that interfere with freedom of movement and
action, while informational privacy is often traded for
other, more important benefits.
Both Stone and Posner attempted to evaluate the NSA
surveillance program using cost-benefit analysis. The
Posner: "Warrants offer the
executive branch a 'legalfig leaf'
shielding itfrom direct
accountability.
"
problem for Stone was that the potential benefit ofpreventing
a terrorist attack will always be a huge number: when tens
of thousands of lives are at stake, almost any restriction on
civil liberties will appear efficient and appropriate. Posner
agreed that the scale of potential terror attacks drastically
alters the cost-benefit analysis, but argued that the scale of
potential disaster from a successful terrorist attack is
enough to greatly relax traditional restrictions on executive
power. Posner also argued that civil libertarians should fear
another successful terrorist attack on the scale of September
11 more, because such an attack could severely diminish
civil liberties permanently. Seeing no end to the slippery
slope given the skewed nature of cost-benefit analysis
regarding catastrophic events, Stone dismissed Posner's
suggestion by stating that there is no place to sensibly
draw a line of liberties to relinquish.
To listen to this debate online, visit: http'//webcast-Iaw.uchicago.edu/2006/winter/debatestoneposner.mp3. For more information
about additional audio programs you can listen to online or download, visit www.law.uchicago.edu/podcastinstructions.html
Richard Posner is a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a Senior Lecturer at the Law School. His most
recent book is Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11. Geoffrey Stone, '71, is the Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished
Service Professor of Law at the Law School. His most recent book is Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to
the War on Terrorism.
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